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Cases
Emile van der Does de Willebois & Jean-Pierre Brun *
Civil law remedies are a credible and effective tool for
countries interested in recovering stolen assets-----both when
criminal procedures are unlikely to yield a result or in addition
to such measures. They do not replace criminal prosecutions
and confiscation but they complement them by attacking the
economic base of corrupt activities and by focusing on victims’
interests. While common law offers a wider array of options to
exercise proprietary claims on stolen assets, for personal claims
both common and civil law systems offer reasonably similar
avenues. Jurisdictions should consider increasing their use of
legislation and legal concepts dealing with civil measures to
recover profits obtained and damages suffered as a result of
corrupt activities. Recent success stories involving private civil
proceedings illustrate how such a strategic use and combination
of available tools can boost asset recovery efforts.
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Following the entry into force of the UN Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC) in 2005 and more recently the Arab Spring and
a string of scandals in the financial sector, the topic of corruption and
its proceeds has steadily risen up the international policy agenda. The
G8, the G20, and many regional and civil society organizations, are
all putting forward ideas on how best to tackle it. This article aims to
provide a modest contribution to that debate by focusing on an often
overlooked avenue for going after corruption. Before doing so
however, it is important to be clear about the terms, and specifically
about the meaning of the concept of corruption.

I.

Introduction: What is Corruption and
How Do We Respond?

In essence, corruption is an agency problem: one person (the
agent), be he an elected politician or a director of a bank, is supposed
to be acting in the best interests of someone else (the principal), be it
the people of a nation as embodied in the state or the bank’s
shareholders as embodied in the bank itself. Instead the agent allows
his personal interests to take precedence. The agent is furthering his
own interests at the expense of the principal. To be clear, principalagent in its broad sense is not to be confined to its strict legal
meaning, but rather as a sociological description of relationships.
Though traditionally defined as ‘‘the abuse of public office for private
gain,’’ the distinction between public and private sector corruption is
really secondary, concerning only how the power is vested. We
therefore agree with recent definitions of corruption as encompassing
all forms of abuse of entrusted power. In its internal rules on
preventing fraud and corruption, the World Bank defines a corrupt
practice as ‘‘the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or
indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of
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another party,’’ 1 without distinguishing between private or public
sector. Similarly, Transparency International defines corruption as
‘‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.’’ 2
The global legal standard for the fight against corruption, the
UNCAC, does not contain a definition of corruption itself. Instead, in
Chapter 3, the UNCAC lists a whole array of conduct that is
considered to be corrupt, including both public and private sector
bribery and the embezzlement of both public and private sector
funds, 3 thus implicitly endorsing the same idea, namely that
corruption straddles both the public and the private spheres.
In deciding how to respond to corruption, the course of action
most often discussed is criminal action. When confronted with an
abuse of power, we almost inevitably first look to the state to take
enforcement action against the wrongdoer------typically combining a
prison term with the confiscation of the profits from the corrupt act.
Such action could entail a criminal case by a state against the corrupt
defendant or against his assets, or it could entail action in more than
one state if the property to be confiscated is located in a state
different from where the corrupt behavior occurred. The default
inclination is to take criminal action------possibly because of the
corrosive effect to society as a whole. We wish to see the harm done
to the community redressed and look to the criminal prosecutor to
put things right. However, such a response, though understandable,
misses an important component of the effects of corruption. Certainly,
trust has been betrayed and the transgressor must be held
accountable, but in addition corruption causes tangible damage to
society as a whole or to a particular person or category of persons.
Someone has suffered concrete damages as a result of corrupt acts and
needs to receive compensation for their loss. In response to that loss,
we should not be primarily focused on criminal trials but should
rather direct our attention towards private civil action and restorative
justice. 4 This article aims to contribute to the current debate on how
1.

WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD LOANS AND IDA
CREDITS 10 (2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/ProcGuid-10-06-ev1.pdf.

2.

What is the Corruption Perceptions Index?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L
(2011), http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/in_detail.

3.

See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, arts. 15---42, Dec.
14, 2005, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 [hereinafter UNCAC].

4.

In this article, the term ‘‘private civil law’’ is defined as that branch of
law within a national system that is not criminal law, nor other
branches of law defined mainly by a monopoly of the public authorities
as entities that are empowered to commence legal actions. For example,
if a prosecutor brings a case for bribery, that is a criminal action (that
could end in jail time and monetary penalties). If a country brings a
lawsuit for misappropriation of assets against that same wrongdoer, that
is a private civil action (that typically ends with an award of
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to deal with corruption by shining a light on the hitherto underused
tools that private civil law can provide in seeking to redress corrupt
behavior. It will do so specifically by providing an insight into how
private civil action can repair the financial damage suffered by a
victim. It will focus, in other words, on the remedies offered by
private law to recover assets and obtain compensation from the
wrongdoer.
Of course we do not wish to minimize the importance of criminal
prosecutions and confiscation when trying to remedy acts of
corruption. Criminal law expresses society’s disapproval of the corrupt
act and aims at punishment, while civil law focuses on victims’
interests and aims at compensation and restitution. An effective
response to corruption requires the concurrent use of both criminal
and civil law remedies. Civil law remedies can complement criminal
sanctions by attacking the economic base of corrupt activities both in
the public and the private sector. As Tim Daniel and James Maton
point out, ‘‘asset recovery efforts need flexibility’’ and thus a range of
mechanisms needs to be employed to achieve the desired result. 5
Recent success stories of asset recovery via private civil proceedings
can illustrate how.
This article provides a brief overview of the way in which civil
actions can contribute to the fight against corruption. Apart from the
more philosophical reasons why civil remedies merit attention, there
are also more practical issues to be considered. Many criminal law
systems do yet not allow for the distribution of the confiscated
amount to the victim of the crime. Though this shortcoming may be
circumvented in cases of public corruption by a sharing agreement
between states, this is not possible in private corruption cases.
In addition, in most grand corruption cases, certainly where serial
acts of corruption have been committed over a longer period of time,
even if some or all the acts of corruption are proven, it is nearly
impossible to trace all their proceeds (i.e., follow funds from their
immediate incarnation as the proceeds of a corrupt act onwards along
a trail of layered bank accounts and investments). It often happens
that some assets beneficially owned or held by the suspect are frozen,
but that the paper trail is incomplete (due to non-cooperative
jurisdictions or lack of documentation or evidence), preventing the
compensation or the turnover of specified assets and cannot end with
jail time). Hence, ‘‘civil law’’ may also be referred to as ‘‘private law,’’ in
terms of laws under which non-state actors may commence legal actions.
The phrase ‘‘civil law’’ in this context is not intended to mean ‘‘civil
law’’ as opposed to ‘‘common law,’’ designating different types of legal
systems.
5.

Tim Daniel & James Maton, Recovering the Proceeds of Corruption by
Public Officials: A Case Study, in RECOVERING STOLEN ASSETS 463
(Mark Pieth ed., 2009).
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establishment of an evidential link between a specific crime and the
assets, which is still required in many systems of law to establish an
in rem (or proprietary) claim. In addition, substantial portions of
proceeds of corruption are often spent on luxury items which have a
high maintenance cost and depreciate quickly. As most criminal law
systems do not (yet, we hope) allow for the confiscation of assets
which are not related to the crime as replacement value, civil
proceedings, by establishing a general claim for damages, can provide
a remedy to these problems.
Finally, civil remedies also allow an injured party to seek full
damages from third parties whose forfeitable criminal gains may be
negligible. A bank, which knowingly assists in the laundering of
proceeds, may have only gained 1%---3% per year on the account used
for the laundering of the proceeds. In a criminal case that small
percentage would be the only forfeitable criminal gain; in a civil case
however, certain jurisdictions allow the bank to be sued for the entire
damage that is caused.
By identifying challenges and best practices and providing many
case examples, it becomes clear that civil law remedies are a credible
and effective tool for countries interested in recovering stolen assets in
the courts of another country, especially when criminal law avenues
are either not available or have a low likelihood of success. First, this
article provides an overview of the types of actions available to a
victim of corruption seeking redress. Then the article details some of
the ways in which the monetary awards to be paid to the victim can
be calculated.

II. Types of Actions
A defrauded principal has different options available to him to
recoup some of the losses he has suffered. He may have either a
proprietary claim to enforce his ownership rights on a particular
identifiable asset or a personal claim against a particular person or
entity for damages. 6 The advantage of the former is that a proprietary
claim is enforceable independently of the status of unsecured creditors
of the defendant. A particular piece of property attributable to the
corrupt act may be available exclusively to the principal and cannot
be used to satisfy the claims of other creditors. Thus, if the principal
6.

Equitable proprietary claims are available in cases involving abuse of
power by an agent where English law (or one of its many derivatives in
the British Commonwealth) applies. No property claim can be mounted
on the basis of the civilian legal tradition found in continental Europe
(and its derivative legal systems), per se. However, as a practical matter
and through the application of anti-money-laundering laws or criminal
proceedings where the victim may act as a partie civile, a similar result
to the common law tracing and proprietary claim remedies can be
achieved in civil law countries.
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holds a proprietary claim to an asset that is part of an estate in
bankruptcy, the principal can enforce his claim against that asset as if
there were no bankruptcy. If he holds only a personal claim and the
agent is impecunious or bankrupt, his claim will be satisfied in equal
measure to all other creditors, and he may obtain only a small part of
his full claim. In this situation a proprietary claim is preferable. In
other situations, however, personal claims may be useful (e.g., when
the corrupt act has caused personal damage independent of an asset
or damage surpassing the value of a particular asset).
Below we will discuss these civil actions available to a state
victim of corruption or a defrauded employer. As we shall see,
common law offers a wider array of options to exercise proprietary
claims, whereas for personal claims both common and civil law
systems offer reasonably similar options.
A.

Proprietary Actions

The UNCAC explicitly recognizes states’ obligations to ‘‘take such
measures as may be necessary to permit another State Party to
initiate civil action in its courts to establish title to or ownership of
property acquired through the commission of [a corruption] offence’’
and to ‘‘recognize another State Party’s claim as a legitimate owner of
property [so] acquired.’’ 7 An owner of an asset should be able to
exercise his full rights to that asset, no matter who has possession of
it. That is the basic idea underlying proprietary actions under both
civil and common law systems. The difference lies in distinctions in
the way that ownership is understood. The slightly more
differentiated understanding of ownership under common law allows
for a wider variety of legal action.
1.

The constructive trust

Unlike civil law systems, the common law makes a distinction
between the person holding legal title to an asset and the person
holding so-called beneficial title to it, the beneficial owner. 8 The latter
is the one ultimately in control of the asset, who should ultimately be
enjoying the benefit of the asset in question. In many cases, the legal
and beneficial owner will be one and the same person (e.g., I am the
legal owner of my car and am also the one in full control of it,
enjoying its benefits) but in some cases they will not. The prime
example is the trustee who holds legal title to a piece of real estate,
but may do so for the benefit of certain beneficiaries who may not yet
7.
8.

UNCAC, supra note 3, art. 53(a) & (c).
See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES
MATERIALS 553−54 (2012) (discussing the current status of legal
and beneficial ownership in courts of equity as opposed to the courts
found in most American states).

AND
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have come of age. The trustee has a fiduciary duty towards the
beneficiaries to take proper care of the asset in question. How this
distinction is applied under English law in situations of bribery or
fraud is currently unclear. There are two strands of case law on this-----one implying a wider extension of the concept of trust than the other.
Also, not all common law systems are as conservative in their
approach to this area as is English law proper. 9
Until recently, under English law, it was generally understood
that a defrauded principal who is the victim of embezzlement or
whose employee has accepted a bribe, would qualify as the beneficial
owner of the traceable proceeds of corruption. As such, he can
exercise his right against the person holding legal title and claim back
his property. The concept of what constitutes property in situations
where a proprietary claim can be asserted is very wide and includes
assets that may never have been part of the estate of the victim. The
fact that embezzled state funds would qualify as state property, and
therefore subject to a proprietary claim, may be easily understood-----the funds in question (provided they can be traced 10) after all were
once part of the assets of the state. 11 However the notion of what may
be recovered stretches further than that. Even a bribe paid to an
official in furtherance of obtaining a certain contract could qualify as
property to which the state holds beneficial title 12------and thus the state
could vindicate, as beneficial owner, the repayment of that bribe.
Since the defrauded principal is considered the owner of the stolen
property, his claim extends not only to the property in question but
also to any profits that may have derived from it. In addition, it not
only extends to the property itself but also to any substitute assets
into which the original property may have been converted. The
beneficial interest of the defrauded principal remains attached to the
asset along the way. It is here that the uniquely common law concept
of ‘‘tracing’’ becomes relevant. 13 Tracing is the process:
9.

For instance, U.S. and Canadian courts recognize the so-called
‘‘remedial’’ constructive trusts, while English courts do not. Under a
remedial constructive trust, the court has jurisdiction to declare
property held by a defendant to be beneficially owned by a claimant
where to find otherwise would be ‘‘unconscionable.’’

10.

See UNCAC, supra note 3, art. 31(2).

11.

See e.g., Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the Production of Legal
Doctrine, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 993, 1003−06 (2008) (explaining why
and how a victim of embezzlement has a relative proprietary claim
under tracing, contract, and property principles).

12.

See, e.g., Attorney General of H.K. v Reid [1993] UKPC 36, 38 (P.C.)
(N.Z.).

13.

Unique in a private civil law context, that is. For criminal confiscation,
civil law jurisdictions do allow for tracing of assets------the following
proceeds of crime through their different forms.
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[B]y which a claimant demonstrates what has happened to his
property, identifies its proceeds and the persons who have
handled or received them, and justifies his claim that the
proceeds can properly be regarded as representing his property.
Tracing is also distinct from claiming. It identifies the traceable
proceeds of the claimant’s property. It enables the claimant to
substitute the traceable proceeds for the original asset as the
subject matter of his claim. 14

The holder of the beneficial interest can follow this trail and
exercise his claim even where there have been numerous successive
transactions. His interest binds everyone who takes the property or its
traceable proceeds except a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice of the breach of trust.
For example, in Attorney General v. Reid, Charles Warwick Reid,
a lawyer from New Zealand, arrived in Hong Kong to join the
Attorney General’s Chambers in 1975 and eventually worked his way
up to Principal Crown Counsel and the head of Hong Kong’s
Commercial Crime Unit. 15 By 1989, he had acquired control of assets
amounting to roughly HK $12.4 million, inexplicably and
disproportionate to his earnings. In October 1989, Reid was suspended
from duty and arrested by Hong Kong’s Independent Counsel Against
Corruption on suspicion of corruption. 16
The Attorney General of Hong Kong fought a precedent-setting
battle all the way up to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in London in order to recover the portions of approximately HK $12.4
million of bribe money that had been converted into property after
passing through various corporate vehicles and legal owners in New
Zealand on Reid’s behalf. The issue at stake was that the Government
of Hong Kong maintained that it held a registrable interest in the
Reid-owned real properties in New Zealand, as they represented the
proceeds of bribery while Reid was in dereliction of his fiduciary
duties as a civil servant. 17 The Privy Council judgment took for
granted that the New Zealand properties were purchased with Reid’s
bribe money.
The Privy Council determined that the assets received by Reid as
bribe payments should have been ‘‘paid or transferred instanter to the
person who suffered from the breach of duty.’’ 18 This point is of great
14.

See Foskett v. McKeown and Others, [2001] 1 A.C. 102 (H.L.) (Eng.)
(describing tracing as ‘‘neither a claim nor a remedy’’ but as merely a
‘‘process’’).

15.

See Reid, [1993] UKPC at 36.

16.

See id.

17.

See id. (discussing that Hong Kong seeks to register caveats against the
three properties in New Zealand).

18.

Id.
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significance to the legal relationship held between the bribe-receiving
fiduciary and the party whose trust has been betrayed; it provides the
promise of a meaningful means of redress. Due to the Privy Council
ruling, English common law (and many other legal systems)
recognized that property acquired------either innocently or criminally-----in breach of trust belongs in equity to the cestui que trust (i.e., the
beneficiary). In other words, persons holding such property do so
constructively on trust for the true owner. 19 It also held that if the
value of the property representing the bribe depreciated, the fiduciary
had to pay the injured person the difference between that value and
the initial amount of the bribe. 20 If the property increased in value,
the fiduciary was not entitled to retain the excess since equity would
not allow him to make any profit from his breach of duty. While not
without its controversies, in many English speaking locales the
Constructive Trust Doctrine is now a useful tool for those who seek to
prevent the dispersal of corrupt funds and recover the proceeds of
corrupt activities, such as bribery.
Similarly, in Kartika Ratna Thahir v. Pertamina, Pertamina, an
Indonesian state-owned enterprise whose principal business was the
exploration, processing, and marketing of oil and natural gas, sought
to recover bribes paid to Pertamina executive Haji Tharir by two
contractors hoping for better contractual terms and preferential
treatment. 21 The bribes were deposited by the executive into a bank
in Singapore. 22 In determining whether Pertamina had a proprietary
claim on the funds in the account, the court found that Thahir owed
a fiduciary duty to Pertamina and that the bribes received by him
were held as a constructive trustee for Pertamina, meaning Pertamina
held a proprietary claim to the funds. 23
However, as indicated, it is not clear now whether the concept of
constructive trust is still to be interpreted so extensively. A court
decision rendered just two years ago has cast doubt on the more
extensive use of the constructive trust doctrine as laid out above. In
essence, Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd. v. Versailles Trade Finance
Ltd., drawing on old case law from the English Court of Appeal,
makes a distinction between a fiduciary enriching himself by depriving
a claimant of an asset (in which case there is a constructive trust) and
19.

There are limitations imposed on this idea to protect innocent third
party holders of property who have given value without notice of the
underlying breach of trust.

20.

See Reid, [1993] UKPC 36.

21.

See Thahir v. Pertamina, [1994] 3 SLR 257, [2]---[3] (Sing.) (discussing
that bribes were paid and deposited into the bank in favor of Haji
Thahir, who was employed by Pertamina).

22.

See id. at [46].

23.

See id. at [57].
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a fiduciary enriching himself by doing wrong to a claimant (in which
case there is not). The Sinclair case concerned breaches of fiduciary
duty by an individual, Mr. Cushnie, who solicited funds from
investors and others. 24 The individual investors’ money was invested
in a BVI company controlled by Mr. Cushnie called Trading Partners
Limited (TPL). 25 TPL held the funds on an express trust for the
investors to use it to acquire title to factored trade receivables. TPL
applied that money illegitimately to various fraudulent activities
including passing the money to a company called Versailles Trade
Finance (VTF), another of Mr. Cushnie’s vehicles, in order to
artificially inflate the share price of VTF’s holding company,
Versailles Group PLC (VGP). 26 Mr. Cushnie sold part of his shares in
VGP for millions, but joint administrative receivers were appointed
over VGP and VTF shortly thereafter at the insistence of the banks. 27
Sinclair (an investor), on behalf of TPL, brought proceedings
asserting a proprietary right over the proceeds of Mr. Cushnie’s sale
of his shares in VGP on the basis that the proceeds were held in
constructive trust for TPL as a result of Mr. Cushnie’s breach of his
fiduciary duties. 28 The importance in this context of ensuring a
proprietary right over the proceeds was that given the insolvency of
VGP, TPL ranked first amongst a number of creditors with claims to
VTF/VGP’s assets.
The English courts considered the legal principles applicable to
the case as if the proceeds were bribes. 29 The Court of Appeal held
that a beneficiary of a fiduciary duty, in principle, cannot claim a
proprietary interest in respect of an asset (e.g., bribes or secret profit)
acquired in breach of such duties unless:
1.

The asset is or has been beneficially the property of the
principal; or

2.

The agent acquired the asset by taking advantage of an
opportunity or right which was properly that of the
principal. 30

24.

Sinclair Investments (U.K.) Ltd. v. Versailles Trade Finance Ltd., [2010]
EWHC 1614, [3], [10], [17] (Eng.).

25.

Id. at [5].

26.

See id. at [8].

27.

See id. at [14].

28.

See id. at [18].

29.

See id. at [33]---[34], [37]---[38] (citing to former cases making a distinction
between receiving profits as bribes as opposed to profits from other
means).

30.

See id. at [72]---[74].
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In relation to secret profit or bribes, the Court of Appeal held
that the claimant is entitled to an equitable account rather than a
proprietary interest and declined to follow the Privy Council’s
decision in Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Reid in this regard. 31
The story does not end there however, and the principle has once
again become unclear as a result of the Court of Appeal’s decision in
FHR European Ventures LLP v. Mankarious. Monte Carlo Grand
Hotel Ltd (MCG) owned the share capital of Monte Carlo Grand
Hotel SAM, which owned the Monte Carlo Grand Hotel in Monaco.
MCG entered into a brokerage agreement with an agent, Mr.
Mankarious, acting through Cedar Capital Partners, on behalf of a
consortium of purchasers to sell the hotel in return for a fee of €10
million once the deal was completed. 32 The consortium bought the
hotel for €211.5 million but was unaware that the agent had received
a commission of €10 million. The consortium sued the agent for the
amount of the payment he received from MCG. 33
The Court of Appeal held that the consortium had a proprietary
remedy as a result of the agent’s breach of his fiduciary duty. The
Court of Appeal held this case was a category two case (pursuant to
Sinclair) and therefore made in exploitation of an opportunity that
was rightfully the beneficiary’s. 34 But the judgment in Sinclair on its
face appeared to have decided that bribes and secret commissions
would not give rise to proprietary remedies. The Court of Appeal
noted that the decision ‘‘throws into clear relief . . . the very
considerable difficulties inherent in the analysis in Sinclair
Investments. . . . This has made the law more complex and uncertain
and dependent on very fine factual distinctions.’’ 35 The Court of
Appeal suggested that if Parliament does not clarify the law, then
only the Supreme Court can provide a coherent and logical legal
framework. 36
Thus, until such time as the position is clarified by the Supreme
Court or Parliament, whether under English law secret commissions
or bribes are recoverable on a proprietary basis will be largely
dependent on the particular facts of the case. The English Court of
Appeal’s decision in Sinclair however, has had no impact on the law
of Hong Kong or of many other British Commonwealth jurisdictions.
What is uncontroversial however is that where there is a clear prior
31.

See id. at [75].

32.

FHR European Ventures LLP v. Mankarious, [2013] EWCA 17, [2], [5]
(Eng.).

33.

See id. at [5], [12].

34.

See id. at [83], [116].

35.

Id. at [116].

36.

See id.
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proprietary right to assets and a defendant disposes of those assets in
breach of a fiduciary duty, a constructive trust can be imposed on the
proceeds of this particular form of corruption.
For example, in State of Libya v. Capitana Seas Ltd., the state of
Libya sought to obtain ownership of a house in London belonging to
Capitana Seas Limited, a company ultimately controlled by Saadi
Qaddafi, the son of the former ruler of Libya, Muammer Qaddafi. The
judge found that he had used state funds to obtain the property and
ruled:
I am satisfied, on the evidence which has been put before me,
that Saadi Quaddafi is the sole ultimate beneficial owner of the
Defendant company [and that] the property was wrongfully and
unlawfully purchased with funds belonging to the Claimant. In
those circumstances, the beneficial interest in the property is
held by the Defendant, for the Claimant, as constructive
trustees. 37

In the above cases, fiduciary duty is defined very widely:
[A] ‘fiduciary relation’ exists (a) whenever the plaintiff entrusts
to the defendant property, including intangible property as, for
instance, confidential information, and relies on the defendant
to deal with such property for the benefit of the plaintiff or for
the purposes authorized by him, and not otherwise . . . and (b)
whenever the plaintiff entrusts to the defendant a job to be
performed, for instance, the negotiation of a contract on his
behalf or for his benefit and relies on the defendant to procure
for the plaintiff the best terms available. . . . 38

It may, as in some of the examples above, give rise to a
constructive trust and thus to a proprietary claim, or it may also
provide a basis for personal claims. 39
2.

Revendication

As noted earlier, the concept of trust is not known by the civilian
legal tradition of continental Europe and consequently there is no way
in which a victim can exercise his rights as a beneficial owner of an
asset held in constructive trust as discussed above. Most civil law
systems do, however, provide for an action to claim back one’s
property as the owner of that property (in French ‘‘action en
revendication’’ and in German ‘‘Vindikationsklage’’) that can be
37.

Muammar el-Qaddafi/Saadi Quaddafi/London Mansion Case, STOLEN
ASSET RECOVERY INITIATIVE, THE WORLD BANK, http://star.worldbank
.org/corruption-cases/node/19587 (last visited Apr. 22, 2013).

38.

Reading v. Attorney General, [1951] A.C. 507 (H.L.).

39.

See discussion supra Part II(A)(1).
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exercised against anyone holding that property------though exceptions
for bona fide acquirers in certain circumstances may apply. However,
those actions tend to be limited in scope to the return of the thing
(res) itself (i.e., there is no tracing of the asset through changes in its
original form) and are sometimes limited in time and do not typically
extend to profits generated by the asset. 40 Typically, money as such
cannot be the subject of a proprietary action under civil law. As one
writer noted:
It is almost an axiom of civil law [countries] that money lacks
‘‘droit de suite’’ and ‘‘droit de preference.’’ In whatever way
money has passed hands, the person who holds title, has, at
best, a personal action, not a real one, and thus does not have
the position of a ‘‘separatist’’ in case of bankruptcy. . . . 41

While as a general rule that may be the case, there are some cases
stretching these limits. In a recent court decision in Quebec, 42 a judge
ruled that provided that a sum of money could be clearly identified, a
real action was available to the claimant. In this case, a party who
was the owner of a claim against a third party that had been executed
and the proceeds of which were held by the Receiver General of
Quebec, sought to revendicate the amount of those funds plus
interest, 43 seeking application of articles 912 and 953 of the Civil Code
of Quebec:
912. The holder of a right of ownership or other real right may
take legal action to have his right acknowledged. . . .
953. The owner of property has a right to revendicate it against
the possessor or the person detaining it without right, and

40.

This is not true for all civil law systems, for example in German law.

41.

See E.J.H. SCHRAGE E.A. (RED) DE ROL VAN GELD IN HET PRIVAATRECHT
SYMPOSIUM OVER RECHT EN GELD 13 (2004) (translation by author).

42.

Saroglou v. Canada (Receiver General), 2012 QCCS 602 (Can.). It is
acknowledged that the legal system of Quebec is mixed common and
civil law. The civil (private) law of Quebec was once generally
considered to be civil law in nature, whereas public and criminal law
was considered to operate according to Common law rules of
construction of statutes because Canada is a federal state and natural
laws are supposed to be applied uniformly under rules established by the
Supreme Court of Canada. However, things are changing. Quebec courts
have begun to adopt purely common law inventions like the Mareva (or
freeze order) injunction or the Anton Piller order (or private search and
seizure order).

43.

Id.
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may object to any encroachment or to any use not
authorized by him or by law. 44

In determining whether a revendication action can be instituted
for a sum of money, the judge agreed with previous case law that,
‘‘Money is a fungible asset, to be able to revendicate title to it, it
should be clearly identifiable. It is not sufficient that it be [merely]
quantifiable’’ 45 and concluded that ‘‘[i]t appears, therefore, that for an
action in revendication to lie in regard to a sum of money, certain
factual proof must be made concerning the type of accounting and
deposit that has been used,’’ 46 thus making it clear that there is no
principled basis to object to a revendication action for funds-----provided they are identifiable. 47
Now while there is thus some marginal precedent for a proprietary
action to claim back funds under the civil law tradition, it is in no
way as well developed as the constructive trust doctrine under the
branch of common law known as equity. Also there is certainly no
precedent for any claim of profits generated with the funds in
question. Proprietary claims and remedies will not be available in all
cases. For instance they may not be available in the absence of a
breach of fiduciary duty. A bank has no proprietary claim under
English law to the proceeds of an armed bank robbery, because a
bank robber is in no way an agent of the victim bank. Equally, some
commentators claim that if the proceeds of an abuse of power cannot
be traced because they have been successfully laundered so as to
render it impossible to demonstrate a link between the original funds
and the funds ultimately identified in the defendant’s estate, a
proprietary claim will fail. In that case recourse will have to be made
to a personal claim against persons holding the assets in question or
those who have participated in the corrupt act or the ensuing money
laundering. However, this understates the rules of equitable
proprietary tracing. Tracing is not limited to ‘‘following’’ the proceeds
of corruption in the physical sense. The law of tracing provides a
series of rules of presumption and shifting burdens of proof to allow a
judge to decide who may be the true owner of a property. For
instance, equity (which is, again, the branch of the common law we
are concerned with) says that if a dishonest agent has mixed his
44.

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 912, 953 (Can.).

45.

Saroglou, 2012 QCCS 602, ¶ 44 (translating Justice Clément Gascon’s
comment).

46.

Id. ¶ 47.

47.

Since in the current case the judge could not determine whether the
funds had in fact been intermingled with other funds, he did not
pronounce a final ruling but sent it back to the judge seized of the
merits of the case.
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principal’s assets with those of his own, he is presumed to have
dissipated his personal assets first------leaving any remainder deemed to
belong to his principal. Moreover, an agent can be sued for an
accounting of his use of his principal’s funds. If he fails to account for
what he has done with his principal’s property, (a) he is liable
personally to restore the same on the basis of an equitable damages
award, and (b) what property remains under his control can be
impressed with an equitable charge or lien.
B.

Personal Claims

We will now turn to an examination of the ways in which a
victim of corruption can recover damages from a defendant based on a
personal claim sounded in breach of contract, tort, or unjust
enrichment. Damages are generally understood as ‘‘[m]oney claimed
by, or ordered to be paid to a person as compensation for loss or
injury.’’ 48 The object of awarding damages is to redress the monetary
loss suffered by the victim as a result of an act or omission. The basic
rule for the determination of damages in corruption cases provides
that the victim must be placed as much as possible in the situation he
would have been in but for the commission of the corrupt act. Thus,
all expenses or lost profits caused by the corrupt act must be
compensated. 49 A plaintiff’s right to compensation may be reduced or
disallowed in case he himself is found to be (contributorily)
negligent. 50
In the current context, where a corrupt act has occurred, a
plaintiff must demonstrate damage, the breach of a duty owed to the
plaintiff by a defendant, and the causal link between the act and the
damage. 51 Apart from liability of those who directly initiated or
48.

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 445 (9th ed. 2009).

49.

Compensation may cover material damage, loss of profits and nonpecuniary loss. Civil Law Convention on Corruption, art. 3(2), Nov. 4,
1999, E.T.S. No. 174 (entered into force Nov. 1, 2003). Section 38 of the
Explanatory Report states that the material damage (damnum
emergens) refers to the actual reduction in the economic situation of the
person who has suffered the damage. The loss of profits (lucrum
cessans) represents the profit that could reasonably have been expected
but that was not gained because of the corrupt act. Id., Explanatory
Report, art. 38.

50.

See, e.g., id. art. 6.

51.

For example, Article 4 of the Convention states:
Each Party shall provide in its internal law for the following
conditions to be fulfilled in order for the damage to be compensated:
(i)
(ii)

the defendant has committed or authorised the act of
corruption, or failed to take reasonable steps to prevent
the act of corruption;
the plaintiff has suffered damage; and
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committed the act in question (i.e., the donor and recipient of the
bribe or the government official who embezzled funds), those who
somehow facilitated the act (e.g., banks through which the funds have
passed, lawyers whose clients’ accounts were used in transferring
stolen assets, trust, and company service providers involved in the
setting up and management of shell corporations) may, depending on
the legal system, also be liable because they either dishonestly assisted
a corrupt agent to breach his fiduciary duty of loyalty owed to his
principal------or were recklessly indifferent to obvious risks (or were
guilty of ‘‘blind eye knowledge of the obvious’’), or were merely
negligent in their due diligence concerning the origin of funds or the
purpose of the transaction. However, it is rare when a legal system
allows a third party (like a bank) to be successfully sued for
negligently assisting in a fraud. Usually, no duty of care is said to
exist to unforeseen or unknown third party victims, or the defendant
hides behind contractual disclaimers of liability for negligence.
1.

Contract

In certain cases of corruption there will be a contractual
relationship between the harmed party and the perpetrator of the
corrupt act. For bribery the situations that most readily jump to
mind is of an employment contract between a principal (harmed
party) and his agent (person receiving the bribe) or a contract for the
performance of works between a state (harmed party) and a private
company (person paying the bribe). 52 Where embezzlement is
concerned, the embezzler will often be in some way employed, or
performing certain services for the harmed party. The question then is
to what extent that contractual relationship can provide the basis for
an action for breach of contract and what sort of damages may be
awarded as a result. In some cases even a third party beneficiary from
a contract can seek to recover damages.
Under the UN Oil for Food Program (OFFP), the UN Security
Council established a vehicle for the sale and lifting of Iraqi crude oil
(iii)

there is a causal link between the act of corruption and
the damage.

Id. art. 4(1).
52.

The bribe contract itself is, of course, invalid ob turpem causam. Cf.
Civil Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 49, art. 8 (‘‘Each party
shall provide in its internal law for any contract or clause of a contract
providing for corruption to be null and void.’’). This is also the rule in
the list of transnational principles, which states ‘‘[c]ontracts based on or
involving the payment or transfer of bribes (‘corruption money’, ‘secret
commissions’, ‘pots-de-vin’, ‘kickbacks’) are void.’’ Center of
Transnational Law, No. IV.7.2(a) Invalidity of Contract Due to Bribery,
TRANS-LEX, http://www.trans-lex.org/output.php?docid=938000 (last
visited Apr. 22, 2013).
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and for direct financial transactions with the Iraqi regime. 53 The
resolution establishing the OFFP, UN Security Council Resolution
986, permitted the regime to sell Iraqi oil under strict conditions
designed to ensure that the proceeds were used for humanitarian
goods and for the benefit of the Iraqi people. 54 An escrow account was
established at BNP New York in Manhattan, to receive the proceeds
of the oil sales and to pay for the humanitarian goods. 55 The UN and
BNP executed an agreement for banking services that governed the
management of the escrow account. 56 In 2008 the Republic of Iraq
filed a suit with the U.S. District Court in New York, which is still
ongoing. 57
In its claim, the Republic of Iraq asserts that the sole purpose of
the agreement was to protect the interest of the Republic and the
Iraqi people from corrupt and wrongful intentions of the Iraqi
regime. 58 It argues that, among other things, BNP did not disclose
that intermediaries were involved in the sale of oil------which is a
relevant fact since the presence of an intermediary almost always
means the seller (Iraq in this case) is not getting full market value
since the intermediary gets part of the gain. 59 In so doing, it thus
furthered its own commercial interests and that of its commercial
53.

See About the Programme, UN OFFICE FOR THE IRAQ PROGRAMME OILFOR-FOOD, http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/index.html (last
updated Nov. 4, 2003).

54.

Id. (stating that the program was intended to be ‘‘a temporary measure
to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, until the
fulfillment by Iraq of the relevant Security Council resolutions’’).

55.

Iraq (Oil-for-Food), SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (Apr. 30, 2008),
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/200805/lookup_c_glKWLeMTIsG_b_4065745.php
(stating
that
the
majority of revenue from this program was held in escrow for the
purchase of related items like food, medicine, housing, oil production,
sanitation, etc.)

56.

See id.

57.

Patricia Hurtado, ABB Wins Dismissal of Suit over Hussein Oil-Food
Program, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2013, 4:47 PM), http://www.bloomber
g.com/news/2013-02-06/abb-wins-dismissal-of-suit-over-hussein-oil-foodprogram.html (describing the district court’s dismissal because Iraq
cannot recover for wrongdoing and actions that occurred outside the
United States).

58.

See generally Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, No. 08 Civ. 5951(SHS), 2013
WL 441959 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2013) (describing the overall litigation,
the Iraqi issues raised in the suit, and the initial purpose of the program
being to continue Iraq’s economic isolation while relieving the suffering
of the Iraqi people caused by those sanctions).

59.

See id. at 5 (explaining how Chevron would pay intermediaries a
premium above the official selling price that would be paid as a
surcharge to the Hussein Regime).
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customers------purchasers of oil------to the detriment of the Iraqi people. In
addition the Republic of Iraq claimed that BNP breached the terms of
Resolution 986, which was incorporated into the agreement and which
required full transparency of each transaction. 60 It did so by
concealing material information from its disclosures to the UN,
including information on actual purchasers of oil and the fact that
surcharges were being paid. 61 Thus, according to the claim, BNP
breached the banking agreement through negligence and intentional
conduct, and the Republic of Iraq, as a third party beneficiary of the
contract, should therefore be entitled to recover its actual damages
from them.
Remedies for invalidity or breach of contract will generally
include monetary damages. The absolute invalidity of a contract
made for an unlawful purpose is based on the social harm of
corruption and the violation of general moral principles rather than
on the harm to the aggrieved party (the harm would be an argument
for a ‘‘voidable’’------as opposed to a void------contract). In that case the
principal could be left completely without counter-performance. He,
however, may wish to enforce the contract (e.g., because execution is
already too far advanced). In that case his damages may consist of his
paying too much for the contract (because the contract partner
included the bribe in his calculations). Rescission or annulment of
contract is also possible, particularly in cases of bribery and collusion
in bidding. 62 Article 34 of UNCAC states that, ‘‘States Parties may
consider corruption a relevant factor in legal proceedings to annul or
rescind a contract.’’ 63
The World Duty Free Limited case highlights the void and
voidable distinction. In April 1989, the Government of Kenya
concluded an agreement with the company ‘‘House of Perfume’’ for
the construction, maintenance, and operation of duty-free complexes
in two of the country’s airports. 64 The ‘‘World Duty Free Limited’’
company replaced the ‘‘House of Perfume’’ in May 1990 with an
60.

See id. at 2 (noting that the resolution required Iraq to submit to the
Secretary General a plan of distribution and confirmation that the
humanitarian goods arrived in Iraq).

61.

Id. at 4---5.

62.

Cf. Civil Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 49, art. 8(2)
(‘‘Each Party shall provide in its internal law for the possibility for all
parties to a contract whose consent has been undermined by an act of
corruption to be able to apply to the court for the contract to be
declared void, notwithstanding their right to claim for damages.’’).

63.

UNCAC, supra note 3, art. 34, at 26; see also Civil Law Convention on
Corruption, supra note 49, art. 8(2)

64.

World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/7, ¶ 62 (Oct. 4, 2006).
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amendment to the agreement. 65 In August 1995, a lease was concluded
between the Kenya Airports Authority and World Duty Free. Mr.
Nassir Ibrahim Ali signed these contracts on behalf of the
companies. 66
On June 16, 2000, World Duty Free Limited requested arbitration
of a dispute before the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes. World Duty Free contended that Kenya had
breached the 1989 agreement by illegally expropriating its properties
and destroying its rights under the agreement. 67 Kenya, on the other
hand, argued that the agreement was procured through the payment
of a bribe to Kenya’s then-President Daniel Arap Moi. Hence, it
claimed that it was unenforceable as a matter of public policy. 68
The Tribunal first considered whether Mr. Ali had paid a bribe to
President Moi and whether the agreement had been procured as a
result of a bribe. It then examined the consequences of the bribe on
the validity and enforceability of the agreement under both public
policy and applicable laws. 69 The Tribunal found that the payments
by Mr. Ali on behalf of the House of Perfume to President Moi were
bribes that were given in order to obtain the 1989 agreement. 70 The
Tribunal highlighted that bribery is contrary to the international
public policy of most, if not all, states. Thus, it concluded that claims
based on contracts of corruption or on contracts obtained by
corruption could not be upheld by it. 71 Citing Lord Mustill’s legal
opinion, 72 the Tribunal accepted that there is a distinction between
contracts which are void and those which are voidable. A void
contract is the one that is so defective ‘‘as to make it entirely
ineffectual in the eyes of the law. It is from the outset empty of
content.’’ 73 In contrast, a voidable contract is intrinsically valid and
the injured party ‘‘has the option of rescinding the contract, declaring
itself free from further obligations, and if necessary going to the court
to obtain a decree to that effect.’’ 74
Although in practice the outcome is often the same, there are
some differences. Where a contract is void, no action is required to
65.

Id. ¶ 63.

66.

Id. ¶ 126.

67.

Id. ¶¶ 4, 127.

68.

Id. ¶ 128.

69.

Id. ¶ 129.

70.

Id. ¶ 136.

71.

Id. ¶ 157.

72.

Id. ¶¶ 163---64.

73.

Id. ¶ 164.

74.

Id.
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expunge it since its failure is an ‘‘automatic’’ consequence. By
contrast, where a contract is voidable, the injured party must take a
positive action to set it aside. According to the Tribunal, ‘‘Corruption
of a state officer by bribery is synonymous with the most heinous
crimes because it can cause huge economic damage: its long-term
victims can be legion.’’ 75 Therefore, like any other contract, a state
contract procured by bribing a state officer is legally unenforceable
‘‘as an affront to the public conscience.’’ 76 The Court concluded that
with regards to public policy both under English and Kenyan law,
World Duty Free was not legally entitled to maintain any of its
claims. It also added that Kenya was legally entitled to avoid the
agreement and that it had not lost its right to avoid it by
affirmation. 77 The Court also noted the disturbing fact that Kenya
had not yet taken any actions to prosecute its former president for
corruption or to recover the bribe in civil proceedings. 78
Depending on the legal system, avoidance can be either
retroactive or limited to the application of the contract in the future.
Counter-performance and expenses incurred by the contractor------for
example, having to redo a tender process or negotiating a new
contract------may then also qualify as damages. Under certain
circumstances any profits can also be disgorged. Though in principle
damages are measured by the plaintiff’s loss, not the defendant’s gain,
it is clear that no one can be allowed to profit from a contractual
breach where that breach constitutes a wrong. ‘‘In a suitable case the
damages for breach of contract may be measured by the benefit
gained by the wrongdoer from the breach.’’ 79
In Attorney General v. Blake, 80 Blake was a member of the United
Kingdom’s intelligence service. When he joined MI-6, Blake ‘‘expressly
agreed in writing that he would not disclose official information,
during or after his service, in book form or otherwise. He was
employed on that basis.’’ 81 In 1990 he published his autobiography No
Other Choice, 82 in which he disclosed a great deal of information
covered by the provision in his contract. The court ruled that, even
though the Crown had suffered no damages from Blake’s disclosures,

75.

Id. ¶ 173.

76.

Id.

77.

Id. ¶ 188.

78.

Id. ¶ 180.

79.

Attorney General v. Blake, [2000] UKHL 45 (Eng.).

80.

Id.

81.

Id.

82.

GEORGE BLAKE, NO OTHER CHOICE (1990).
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the profits gained from the publication of the book were to be paid to
the Untied Kingdom as his employer. 83 The court stated:
In considering what would be a just response to a breach of
Blake’s undertaking the court has to take these considerations
into account. The undertaking, if not a fiduciary obligation, was
closely akin to a fiduciary obligation, where an account of
profits is a standard remedy in the event of breach. Had the
information which Blake has now disclosed still been
confidential, an account of profits would have been ordered,
almost as a matter of course. In the special circumstances of the
intelligence services, the same conclusion should follow even
though the information is no longer confidential. That would be
a just response to the breach. I am reinforced in this view by
noting that most of the profits from the book derive indirectly
from the extremely serious and damaging breaches of the same
undertaking committed by Blake in the 1950s. As already
mentioned, but for his notoriety as an infamous spy his
autobiography would not have commanded royalties of the
magnitude Jonathan Cape [the publisher] agreed to pay. 84

Disgorgement of profits is sometimes referred to by the somewhat
‘‘unhappy’’ 85 term of restitution. Its objective is to divest the
defendant of the benefit he received and prevent unjust enrichment. 86
According to the principle of ‘‘unjust enrichment,’’ one person should
not be permitted to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another,
but should be required to make restitution for property or benefits
unjustly received. Disgorgement is the forced giving up of illegally
obtained profits.
Pursuant to Article 423 of the Swiss Law on Obligations (agency
in the interest of the agent ‘‘gestion imparfaite’’), where agency
activities were not carried out with the best interests of the principal
in mind, the principal is entitled to appropriate any resulting
benefits. 87 The conditions for application of this article are fourfold:
(a) a profit (b) caused by (c) an act of interference (d) attributable to
an agent acting in bad faith. Clearly a bribe would qualify as a profit
and thus the article would entitle the principal to reclaim any bribes
from his agent. It is a question of debate whether this would also
cover the benefit that the corrupting contractual party derives from
83.

Blake, [2000] UKHL 45.

84.

Id.

85.

See Blake, [2000] UKHL 45 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead).

86.

DONALD HARRIS, DAVID CAMPBELL & ROGER HALSON, REMEDIES
CONTRACT AND TORT 231 (2d ed. 2005).

87.

CODE DES OBLIGATIONS [CO] [Code of Obligations] March 30, 1911, art.
423 (Switz).
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the contract (e.g., the net profit made on the contract). Depending on
what rights one deems protected by the article, such profits may be
covered. A large conception of what rights are at stake (and thus
whether an infringement on that right would constitute an act of
interference) would allow for an action based on this article against
the corrupting contracting party. 88
Quite apart from that, Article 9 of the federal law on unfair
competition states that whoever, through an act of unfair competition
(which includes bribery), suffers or is likely to suffer prejudice to his
business or his economic interests in general, may require the
surrender of profits in accordance with the provisions on agency
without authority. 89 Whilst a logical consequence of the maxim that
no one can profit by his own wrong, the disgorgement of profits is not
punitive in character------for that there is the criminal law. Still, the
possibility of taking away profits gained through an act of corruption
may also have a preventive effect on perpetrators of corruption.
Depending on the legal system, it can be possible to successfully
submit a claim cumulatively both for damages suffered by the
plaintiff and the disgorgement of profits made by the defendant. Thus
a state that is the victim of bribery may be able to both claim the
profits that a party made as a result of the bribe and the damages
that it suffered as a result (e.g., because the execution of the contract
was faulty or because a new tender process had to be initiated). Quite
apart from that, certain courts, mainly in the common law world (in
particular in the United States), can also impose punitive damages on
the perpetrator, the effect of which is, as the name suggests, to punish
the perpetrator. The possibility of such damages clearly does have a
preventive effect:
An award of punitive damages expresses the community’s
abhorrence at the defendant’s act. We understand that
otherwise upright, decent, law-abiding people are sometimes
careless and that their carelessness can result in unintentional
injury for which compensation should be required. We react far
more strongly to the deliberate or reckless wrongdoer, and an
award of punitive damages commutes our indignation into a
kind of civil fine, civil punishment. Some of these functions are
also performed by the criminal justice system. 90

88.

See Christine Chappuis La Restitutions des Profits Issue de la
Corruption: Quels Moyens en Droit Prive?, in Lutte Contre La
Corruption------The Never Ending Story (Bernard Bertossa et al. eds.,
2011).

89.

LOI FÉDÉRALE CONTRE LA CONCURRENCE DÉLOYALE [LCD] [Law on
Unfair Competition] Dec. 19, 1986, art. 9 [Switz.].

90.

Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Indeed civil law countries tend not to have the concept of punitive
damages partly for that reason: they consider punishment to be the
realm of criminal, not civil, law.
2.

Tort

A tort is an act or an omission that causes damage to another
person that constitutes a legal ground for the payment of damages to
the person wronged by the person to whom the act or omission may
be attributed. 91 Damages compensate a plaintiff for loss, injury, or
harm directly caused by a breach of duty, including criminal
wrongdoing, immoral conduct, or pre-contractual fault by the
tortfeasor. 92
In bribery cases, since both parties to the bribery act wrongfully
towards the principal, courts have held that both the recipient and
the donor of the bribe committed a joint tort and thus the victim is
entitled to recover from either party. To be clear: such joint liability
does not mean that a victim could recover twice.
It is impossible to give a complete overview of the types of acts
that may qualify as a civil wrong.
In the context of corruption cases, civil fraud, tortious
interference, conspiracy, breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, or
breach of agency duty(giving rise to, among other things, claims for
an accounting for the use and application of a principal’s property) ,
as well as abuse of power in office are all relevant causes of action. In
breach of trust or fiduciary duty cases, equitable damages will often
be available to remedy any impossibility to trace assets.
In one illustrative case, the Republic of Korea wished to purchase
military equipment and solicited competing bids from manufacturers.
Plaintiff Korea Supply Company (KSC) represented one of the
manufacturers, MacDonald Dettwiler, and stood to receive a
commission of over $30 million if the contract was awarded to that
manufacturer. 93 Ultimately, the contract was awarded to Loral (now
Lockheed Martin Tactical Systems). 94 KSC contended that even
though MacDonald Dettwiler’s bid was lower and its equipment
superior, it was not awarded the contract because Loral Corporation
91.

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1626 (9th ed. 2009). A tort is ‘‘[a] civil
wrong, other than breach of contract, for which a remedy may be
obtained, usu. in the form of damages; a breach of a duty that the law
imposes on persons who stand in a particular relation to one another.’’
Id.

92.

See id. at 445 (damage relates ‘‘to monetary compensation for loss or
injury to a person or property’’).

93.

Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 941 (Cal.
2003).

94.

Id.
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and its agent had offered bribes and sexual favors to key Korean
officials. 95 KSC instituted an action asserting (amongst others) a
claim under the tort of interference with prospective economic
advantage. 96 Under the common law of the United States, the
elements for a successful action are:
(1) An economic relationship between the plaintiff and some
third party, with the probability of future economic benefit
to the plaintiff;
(2) The defendant’s knowledge of the relationship;
(3) Intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to
disrupt the relationship;
(4) Actual disruption of the relationship; and
(5) Economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the
acts of the defendant. 97

The Supreme Court of California found that all those conditions were
met and hence KSC did have an action in tort against Loral
(Lockheed).
In another case, Misappropriation of Public Funds and Breach of
Fiduciary Duty: The Case Against Frederick Chiluba and Others, 98
the Attorney General of Zambia (AGZ) for and on behalf of the
Republic of Zambia claimed to recover sums which were transferred
by the Ministry of Finance between 1995 and 2001. The money in
question was transferred on the basis that it was required to pay
debts owed by the government. 99
The case fell into three distinct parts, two of which are relevant
here. The first arose out of the transfer of about U.S. $52 million from
Zambia to a bank account operated outside ordinary governmental
processes called the Zamtrop Account held at a bank in London (the
Zamtrop Conspiracy). 100 The other related to payments of about U.S.
$20 million Zambia made pursuant to an alleged arms deal with
Bulgaria and paid into accounts in Belgium and Switzerland, at least
some of which funds found their way to London (the BK

95.

Id.

96.

Id. at 942.

97.

Id. at 950.

98.

Attorney General of Zambia v. Meer Care & Desai, [2007] EWHC (Ch)
952 (Eng.).

99.

Id. at [1].

100. Id. at [2].
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Conspiracy). 101 The Zamtrop Account was set up as part of the
conspiracy to steal. It was operated under a special arrangement to
hide what was going on and to inhibit legitimate queries. 102 There was
equally no legitimate basis for the payments out under the BK
Conspiracy. There were no genuine arms sales to justify the payments
nor would the Republic have entered into the arrangements it did if it
had been properly advised. 103 This too was merely a vehicle for their
fraudulent removal of government money.
The judge found former President Chiluba, his Permanent
Secretary, and other high-ranking officials, to have conspired to
misappropriate a headline figure of more than U.S. $25 million under
the Zamtrop Conspiracy and more than U.S. $21 million under the
BK Conspiracy and to have broken their fiduciary duties which they
owed to the Republic or (for some of them) to have dishonestly
assisted in such breaches. 104
3.

Restitution and unjust enrichment

Apart from tort and contract, unjust enrichment is a separate
cause of action that gives rise to a claim against the person unjustly
enriched. The focus of this action is on ‘‘re-establishing equality as
between two parties as a response to a disruption of equilibrium. Its
raison d’être is founded in the injustice that lies in one person’s
retaining something which he or she ought not to retain, requiring
that the scales be righted.’’ 105 There is no need to show that any loss
was suffered. The elements for unjust enrichment are the receipt of a
benefit and unjust retention thereof at the expense of another. Civil
suits conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the
United States to claim disgorgement of proceeds in bribery cases are
based on the concept of unjust enrichment. The ‘‘at the expense of
another element’’ does not apply, however, when the plaintiff seeks
restitution of secret profits generated by the fraud of a faithless agent.
A public official is an agent and has an unqualified duty to make
restitution of all secret profits.’’ 106

101. Id.
102. Id. at [82], [126].
103. Id. at [257].
104. Id. at [1120], [1132].
105. See Martin S. Kenney, The Fundamentals of a Civil Asset Recovery
Action, in ASSET TRACING & RECOVERY, THE FRAUDNET WORLD
COMPENDIUM 111, 125 (2009).
106. See Michael A. Sachs & Leonard Gumport, Public Corruption:
Maximizing Remedies (County Counsel’s Association of California
Annual Conference paper, Sept. 14---15, 2005), available at
http://www.grlegal.com/Articles/public_corruption_mem_7-11-06.pdf.
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4. Civil action based on a criminal case

A final word needs to be said on the concurrence of a civil claim
with a criminal trial. The criminal act may provide the injured party
with a civil remedy, separately actionable. Thus an act of bribery or
corruption as a criminal offence may, under other legislation, provide
the basis for civil liability.
In the United States for example, if a person has violated the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), such an act may be the
trigger for his civil liability towards those injured by his corrupt act,
even though the FCPA itself does not provide potential claimants
with a possibility of legal redress. 107 An example of this is the
situation in which shareholders of a company convicted of FCPA
violations sue the officers and directors of the company for breaching
their fiduciary duties towards the company, thus acting derivatively
on behalf of the company. An FCPA violation can also function as a
predicate act to bring a civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, albeit in an indirect way. 108 Finally U.S.
federal or state antitrust laws may provide the basis for civil liability
against those who violate the FCPA when there is proof that the act
of corruption has a negative effect on competition between companies
within the U.S. or the state). 109 In the earlier quoted case of KSC v.
Lockheed, 110 the Supreme Court of California confirmed that an
FCPA violation constitutes an act of unfair competition (which
includes a fraudulent business act or practice) under California’s
unfair competition law and thus triggers liability under that law. 111
In many civil law jurisdictions, the criminal procedure laws allow
the victim that is harmed by an offense and has suffered damage to
participate in a criminal case as a civil party. Thus, in addition to
107. Richard L. Cassin, The FCPA Is No Private Matter, THE FCPA BLOG:
THE WORLD’S LARGEST ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE PORTAL (Mar.
2, 2008), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/3/3/the-fcpa-is-no-priva
te-matter.html (stating that in the leading case addressing FCPA
private right of action, Lamb v. Philip Morris, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
could not ‘‘find anything in the FCPA giving private parties the right to
enforce the law’’).
108. Since FCPA is not listed as a predicate act in RICO, a violation of the
federal Travel Act, which prohibits travel with intent to promote
‘‘unlawful activity’’ (i.e., the FCPA violation), has to be proved to
conclude a violation of RICO. See e.g., Dooley v. United Techs. Corp.,
803 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1992); see also Edward W. Little, Use of the
FCPA in State-Law Unfair Competition Cases, 19 BUS. TORTS LITIG.,
Fall 2011, at 4, available at http://www.mccarter.com/new/files/18278
_little-reprint.pdf.
109. See id.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 93---97.
111. See Korea Supply, 63 P.3d at 953.
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pursuing damages in the context of a separate civil litigation, the
victim can join the criminal proceedings. The affected state must be
aware of the ongoing foreign criminal investigation to be able to join
the criminal proceedings as a civil party. The affected state’s claim for
damages will be adjudicated within the criminal trial, and in some
jurisdictions the country will not be obliged to bring a separate civil
lawsuit. Becoming a civil party in criminal proceedings is usually
faster, simpler, and less expensive. Also, it is possible to maintain
frequent contact with the prosecutor and the investigating judge.
There are only a few cases of foreign bribery where countries have
participated as a partie civile parties in criminal proceedings. 112
For example, in 2007, Nigeria became a civil party in a money
laundering case initiated in France against Dan Etete, the former
Minister of Energy of Nigeria. 113 Etete was convicted and received a
suspended prison sentence. 114 Nigeria as a civil party was awarded
€150,000 for non-pecuniary damages. 115
A prior criminal conviction may, as we have seen, make it easier
to establish the basis for civil liability. An acquittal will not, as a
112. In France, according to Article 2 of the French Criminal Procedure
Code, a party may obtain civil compensation from a criminal court
when the party can show personal and direct damage resulting from the
crime.
113. See Biodon Omojola, Africa Oil and Gas Today: Bone in the Throat,
AFRICA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.africatoday.com/cgi-bin/pub
lic.cgi?sub=news&action=one&cat=177&id=2260.
114. Id.
115. Etete Has His Day in Court, AFRICAINTELLIGENCE.COM (Mar. 25, 2009),
http://www.africaintelligence.com/AEM/oil/2009/03/25/etete-has-hisday-in-court,58139822-ART-ignorevalide (providing a report on the
arbitration process associated with the Etete money laundering case).
There is of course also the interesting development of non-governmental
organizations constituting themselves as partie civile and initiating
investigations on corruption------such as has happened in France, where
the Court de Cassation ruled that Transparency International France
had standing before the court to initiate an investigation against the
ruling families of Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon for
embezzlement of public funds, because the collective interest of the
organization (the fight against corruption) was deemed at stake; or as
happened in Spain when a Spanish NGO used the accion popular,
according to which any Spanish citizen or NGO can bring a criminal
action before an investigating magistrate, to file a complaint against
family members and close associates of the President of Equatorial
Guinea for the diversion of public funds to the purchase of real estate in
Spain (money laundering). However, since that concerns rather the
ability to initiate a criminal case rather than the ability to recover
assets or damages this rather falls outside the scope of this article. For
an interesting discussion on this see Maud Perdriel-Vassière, How to
Turn Article 51 into Reality?, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN ASSET
RECOVERY (Daniel Thelesklaf & Pedro Gomes Pereira eds., 2011).
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legal matter, prevent a later civil claim. Common law jurisdictions
have very different standards of proof between criminal and civil
cases. In criminal cases, the standard is proof ‘‘beyond a reasonable
doubt’’ whereas for civil matters it tends to be ‘‘proof beyond a
balance of probabilities.’’ While the prosecutor may not be able to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, for example, that, for instance, the
defendant converted state property to his own use, the state as
plaintiff in a private civil lawsuit may be able to prove such fact by a
preponderance of the evidence------that is to say that it was more likely
than not------that he converted that same property to his own use.
Having thus given a brief overview of the possible causes of action
upon which to frame a claim for compensation, we will now proceed
to examine more closely how any monetary awards, based on those
causes of action, might be calculated.

III. REMEDIES: HOW MUCH TO SUE FOR AND HOW ARE
THE DAMAGES CALCULATED?
This section discusses various methods of calculating the value of
assets or the amounts of damages to be sought in a civil lawsuit.
Some methods of calculation overlap with methods used in similar
criminal or other enforcement matters.
A.

Most Common Remedies Used to Quantify Illicit Profits,
Compensation or Restitution

When civil remedies are employed in asset recovery cases, issues
arise with regards to the quantification of the proceeds or the
financial consequences of corrupt activities. The approach taken to
quantify the benefits or the damages generated by corruption depends
on the type of remedy that is used in each particular case. 116 A
jurisdiction seeking the disgorgement of illicit profits will need to
calculate the gains resulting from corruption; if it wants to be
compensated for damages it will need to quantify the financial
consequences of corrupt activities. And if it wants to avoid a contract
awarded by a bribed official, it will calculate the monetary equivalent
of contractual services. These remedies can ensure that the affected
government will recover the financial consequences of corrupt
activities. But making parties ‘‘even’’ does not guarantee deterrence.
This is why other civil remedies including punitive damages and the
calculation of a ‘‘social damage’’ are sometimes advocated as
advancing the deterrence requirements of anticorruption policies.

116. See OECD/The World Bank, Identification and Quantification of the
Proceeds of Bribery: Revised Edition, 30 (Feb. 2012), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264174801-en.
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1.

Disgorgement

The starting point for calculating the benefits of corruption is to
look at the gross or net revenues generated by the illicit contract.
According to the gross revenue method, all revenues received
under the contract obtained by bribery are considered proceeds or
benefits of bribery and are subject to disgorgement. 117
According to the net proceeds method, the benefits subject to
disgorgement are the contract revenues minus certain legitimate costs
or expenses incurred by the briber in executing the contract------for
example the cost of supplying goods and services. 118

Example of the net revenue method
(United States) 119
Proceeds = Net revenues (gross revenues from
the contract minus costs/expenses)
In the Sales of Goods and Services Case, in return for
bribes amounting to U.S. $5 million, a company obtained
projects to build communications networks and control systems
for state-owned enterprises. The revenues from the projects were
valued at U.S. $100 million. The company paid U.S. $25 million
for the goods sold for the projects. The company also disguised
the bribes as a legitimate expense in its books and records, and
deducted the expense from its taxes.
Calculating the Benefit
The benefit subject to confiscation was calculated using
the ‘‘net revenue’’ method:
Revenues received from projects: U.S. $100,000,000
----- Cost of goods sold for projects: U.S. $25,000,000
+ Total amount of bribes paid: U.S. $5,000,000
= Total benefit derived: U.S. $80,000,000
The additional profit method calculates the profits that would
have been made if no bribery had occurred. Thus one would need to
look at similar contracts where no bribery occurred to compare them
to the contract involving bribery. 120
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 31.
120. Id. at 32---33.
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2.

Compensation for damages

The basic rule for the determination of damages is that the victim
must be placed as much as possible in the circumstances in which he
or she would have been but for the bribe. In the case of government
contracts, damages caused by bribery are often the same as increased
profits gained by the contractor. Under this method, courts may have
to estimate the difference between the price or the quality of goods
and services provided by the briber and the price or quality that the
customer would have accepted if its agent had not taken the bribe. 121
For example, in Fyffes Group Ltd. v. Templeman, the claimants
involved in the banana trade claimed that from 1992 to 1996, their
employee Simon Templeman took bribes amounting to over U.S. $1.4
million from or with the connivance of the rest of the defendants in
order to negotiate shipping contracts on terms favorable to the
defendants. 122 Fyffes sought to recover damages from the employee,
the shipping company, and its agents. 123 According to the Court, there
was no dispute that the bribes had influenced the contractor in
agreeing the amount of the freight for each year. 124 As a result, all
defendants were found jointly liable for the value of the bribe. 125 In
addition, the shipping company and its agent (the briber) were liable
to pay additional compensation for the loss that the claimants had
undergone from entering into the contract under unfavorable terms. 126
To calculate this liability, the Court found first that Fyffes would
have entered into a service agreement with the contractor even if the
employee had not been dishonest. 127 As a result, ‘‘ordinary’’ profits
resulting from the application of quantity or rates of shipment that
would have been normally agreed by an honest and public negotiator
were not the result of bribery. 128 In order to calculate the
‘‘unordinary’’ profit and the damages, the Court took into
consideration testimony provided by shipping experts determining the
difference between the amounts actually paid by Fyffes and the
121. Id. at 33. See also JEAN-PIERRE BRUN ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT/THE WORLD BANK, ASSET
RECOVERY HANDBOOK: A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS 72---74 (2011)
(providing a summary of the process by which financial information is
sorted and analyzed after collection).
122. Fyffes Group Ltd. v. Templeman, [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 643; (2000) 97
(25) L.S.G. 40, QBD (Comm).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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amounts that would have been paid, all things being equal, if Fyffes
had been represented in the negotiations by an honest and prudent
broker. 129
This example illustrates how the amount recovered will depend on
the type of remedy sought. In disgorgement cases where courts assess
the bribers’ ill-gotten gains by using the net revenue method, recovery
will be limited to net profits even if they are less than damages
generated by the contract entered into as a result of corruption. As a
result, disgorgement may not ensure full compensation when services
rendered are so deficient that, for instance, a piece of public
infrastructure cannot be used or requires further expense to be put
right.
By contrast, compensation cases focus on the damages suffered by
the affected party. When infrastructure is built in accordance with the
technical requirements and at market rates, it is difficult to identify
and prove a specific damage and disgorgement of profits earned may
ensure a better result.
Jurisdictions may also consider whether their legal framework
allows them to combine both remedies, and claim compensation for
damages in addition to profits to be disgorged. They may also
consider contractual remedies.
3.

Contractual restitution

In contractual litigation, the claimant may be entitled to recover
all sums paid pursuant to the contract (gross revenue) or revenues
after the deduction of the value of expenses and counter performance
incurred by the briber (net revenue). 130 In some jurisdictions courts
have held that the government was entitled to recover all contractual
fees already paid pursuant to the terms of the contract and that the
contractor could not recover unpaid fees or the value of the work
done. 131
In S.T. Grand Inc. v. City of New York, S.T. Grand had entered
into a contract with the city of New York worth U.S. $840,000 to
clean a reservoir. 132 Grand had received U.S. $690,000 but it was
subsequently exposed that the contract was awarded through the
payment of a kickback to a city official. 133 Grand sued the city for the
129. Id.
130. OECD/The World Bank, supra note 116, at 36.
131. See S. T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New York, 208 N.E.2d 105, 108 (N.Y.
1973) (‘‘[W]here work is done pursuant to an illegal municipal contract,
no recovery may be had by the vendor, either on the contract or in
quantum meruit. . . . We have also declared that the municipality can
recover from the vendor all amounts paid under the illegal contract.’’).
132. Id. at 106.
133. Id. at 108.
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unpaid balance while the city counterclaimed to recover the amount it
had already paid. The highest court of New York applied the general
rule that ‘‘where work is done pursuant to an illegal municipal
contract, no recovery may be had by the vendor, either on the
contract or in quantum meruit.’’ 134 Thus, Grand was ordered to forego
the entire amount of the contract, approximately U.S. $840,000.
In other cases however, courts have declined restitution of the full
value of a contract obtained through bribes, if the government of the
bribed official benefited from the contract. Instead, the government
may be awarded the contract price after deducting the value of any
benefits it has received.
In Case of Cameroon Airlines v. Transnet Ltd., 135 the ICC
arbitration tribunal held that Cameroon Airlines, a state-owned
company, was entitled to restitution of the sums paid under certain
maintenance agreements concluded as a result of bribery, minus the
‘‘fair value’’ of the services provided by Transnet. 136 This ‘‘fair value’’
deductible from the amount paid consisted of the commercial price
less the ‘‘commission’’ added by Transnet in order to recoup the
bribes paid to Cameroon Airlines’ employees. 137 The Tribunal held
that ‘‘where an innocent party to a contract tainted by bribery seeks
restitution of that which he has performed South African law requires
that it must make or tender restitution of that which it has received
or if this is not possible tender a monetary substitution of such
benefits instead.’’ 138 The UK High Court of Justice annulled the
award for procedural reasons, but agreed with the tribunal that
Cameroon Airlines was not entitled to the full contract price because
Transnet could exclude its own cost of rendering the services from
restitution. 139
B.

Quantification in Practice and Challenges

Quantifying the proceeds of corruption cases and assessing the
damages is one of the most difficult challenges faced by practitioners.
In particular, the net revenue frequently used in disgorgement cases
brings some particular complications that result from the need to
identify deductible costs attributable to a specific corrupt contract.
Material purchased or staff hired to fulfill this contract are generally

134. Id.
135. Cameroon Airlines v. Transnet Ltd., [2004] EWHC (Comm) 1829
(Eng.).
136. See id. ¶¶ 80---81.
137. Id. ¶¶ 83---84.
138. Id. ¶¶ 80, 123 (emphasis added).
139. Id. ¶¶ 104---15.
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considered variable costs that can be deducted. 140 More problematic
are fixed costs, which the company is incurring in any event, such as
buildings or permanent staff and management who spend part of their
time working on the contract tainted by bribery. 141 While the method
of allocating these costs is clearly defined in many businesses there
will always be an element of judgment in determining if such fixed
costs can be allocated to a specific contract. As a result, Governments
or other entities seeking to recover compensation may need to get
assistance from accounting experts to be able to present arguments to
the court.
Similarly, in contractual compensation litigation, detailed analysis
from accounting as well as technical experts may be necessary to
determine the ‘‘ordinary’’ market rates or profit margin of goods or
services that were inflated by the contractor with the assistance of a
corrupt official. 142 In addition, compensation claims may require the
calculation of interest income earned by the briber, or lost by the
claimant, on amounts awarded as damages. 143 When lengthy periods
are considered, the determination of applicable interest rates and
periods over which the interest is calculated will be crucial.
More generally, some jurisdictions still lack legislation dealing
with civil redress. There are others that may have legislation in place
but have never tested it in practice while they consider calculations
regarding profits obtained and damages suffered as too complicated.
Only a few courts have addressed such issues, and judges generally
still have very little experience. Even when countries have both
adequate legislation in place and courts used to dealing with
quantification issues, it is frequently difficult to identify the proceeds
of corruption and calculate the profits due to the secrecy involved in
corruption deals, especially when the bribery is revealed years after
the contract was awarded.
C. Beyond the Present-----Emerging Theories-----Punitive Damages and
Social Damages

Practitioners should bear in mind that civil remedies can be
largely ineffective when they are perceived as a necessary business

140. See Bernard C. Johnson, Damages-----Breach of Contract-----Accounting
Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 376 & n.3 (1968).
141. Id. at 376 n.4, 378.
142. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 31 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed.,
Inst. for Int’l Economics 1997) (commenting on the difficulty of
quantifying corruption).
143. See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 201.600 (1999).
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expense. 144 Given the low probability of being caught, a company
which engages in corrupt practices and is consistently awarded
government contracts may just consider that being ordered to
disgorge profits or to compensate damages resulting from one single
case is the price to pay for making money later. At the limit it could
be viewed as an investment.
As Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman argues that ‘‘[t]o act as a
deterrent’’ penalties ‘‘would need to be a multiple of actual damages
because those who pay bribes are often not caught.’’ 145 Multiple
damage awards would not only act as an effective deterrent
decreasing the numbers of infringements, but would also incentivize
private plaintiffs to go to court. The most frequently stated purpose
of punitive damages is to punish the defendant for his wrongdoing
and to deter him and others from similar misconduct. 146
The issues surrounding punitive damages warrant more specific
discussion and go beyond the limits of this study. But punitive and
treble damages are a settled practice in the United States. By
contrast, most European states view damages purely as a
‘‘compensatory instrument’’ and damage multipliers as inconsistent
with the principles of compensation. As a result, they tend to and
oppose a system that would result in damages that are higher than
the loss sustained by the victim. 147
In the case of the County of San Bernardino v. Kenneth Walsh,
which involved two bribery schemes, the Court of Appeals held that
‘‘the proper measure of damages is full disgorgement of any secret
profit made by the fiduciary regardless of whether the principal
suffered any damage.’’ 148 The court also upheld the award of punitive
damages, finding it was justified due to the reprehensibility of the
defendants’ conduct, the relationship between the punitive damages
award, the compensatory damages award and the harm done, and the
amount of the award in proportion to each defendant’s net worth. 149
144. Laura J. Kerrigan, The Decriminalization of Administrative Law
Penalties-----Civil Remedies, Alternatives, Policy, and Constitutional
Implications, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 380 (1993).
145. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Anti-Corruption Policy: Can International
Actors Play a Constructive Role?, 20 n.55 (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin
Ctr. for Studies in Law, Economics, & Public Policy Research Paper No.
440), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1926852.
146. 1 LINDA SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2 (6th ed. 2010).
147. See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff
Working Paper, Accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions
for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules 55, ¶ 182 (Apr. 2, 2008), available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2008:0
404:FIN:EN:PDF.
148. 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 848, 856 (Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
149. Id. at 858---59.
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To ensure full compensation and deterrence when punitive damages
are not applicable, other jurisdictions have tried to use the concept of
social damages. In some jurisdictions, a social damage may be defined
as the loss that is not incurred by specific groups or individuals but
by the community as a whole. This could include damages to the
environment, to the credibility of the institutions, or to collective
rights including health, security, peace, education, good governance,
and good public financial management. It is different from damages to
collective rights, which belong to a restricted and identifiable group of
individuals or legal entities. Social damage can be pecuniary and nonpecuniary.
Costa Rica follows a social damages model. 150 In Costa Rica,
prosecutors sought compensation for the social damage caused by
Alcatel in paying bribes to government officials to secure cellular
networks contracts. 151 They filed a claim based on Article 38 of the
Costa Rican Criminal Procedural Code that states that civil action
for social harm may be brought by the Attorney General’s Office in
the case of offenses involving collective or diffuse interests. 152
In its claim, the Attorney General’s office underlined that the
Costa Rican Constitutional Court had previously defined as
‘‘collective and diffuse interests,’’ the ‘‘citizen’s collective interest in
good public finance management’’ and ‘‘the inhabitant’s right to a
healthy environment.’’ 153 To measure the social damages, the office of
the Attorney General hired an external consultant to undertake an
estimation of damages using a methodology that combined the
following elements:
•

The economic consequences of corruption that reduced the
investor’s trust in the Costa Rican Government; 154 and

•

The political consequences that reduced the credibility of
politicians and political parties and thus affecting
(increasing) the levels of abstentions in the elections of
2006. 155

150. See generally Juanita Olaya, Kodjo Attisso & Anja Roth, Repairing
Social Damage Out of Corruption Cases: Opportunities and Challenges
As Illustrated in the Alcatel Case in Costa Rica (Basel Inst. on
Governance, Working Paper, 2010), available at papers.ssrn.com/5d
3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1779834.
151. See id. at 8---9.
152. See id. at 15---17.
153. Id. at 15.
154. Id. at 17.
155. Id.
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To quantify these consequences, experts used a combination of
quantitative analysis and survey data on the average citizen’s
perception to explain and measure the impact. 156 However,
establishing causality both for providing evidence of immaterial social
damage and measuring this damage proved challenging. For example,
it was difficult to define what would have been the level of trust in
the Costa Rican government in the absence of Alcatel’s corrupt
activities. It was similarly complex to quantify the economic
consequences of the loss of trust alleged by prosecutors. 157
In addition, a precedent-setting case involving bribery and
kickbacks in the purchase of medical equipment for the Social
Security System in Costa Rica had previously highlighted the
challenges involved in the concept of social damage. In this case,
prosecutors had sought compensation for social damages estimated to
be around U.S. $89 million, but the court dismissed the evidence. 158
The Attorney General finally accepted a settlement by which the
claims for social damage were dismissed and Alcatel agreed to pay
U.S. $10 million. 159

IV. Conclusion
This article is meant to contribute to the rapidly expanding
debate on corruption and how to deal with it. The citizen’s cry for
justice heard all around the world, from the protests in Cairo to the
outrage over the off-shore leaks, demands that perpetrators are
brought to trial and sentenced, but also that their stolen assets and
profits be returned to the victims. We have tried to show how civil
action can contribute towards this second objective. To be sure, the
amounts of money recovered and repatriated to victim countries so
far are low------and not commensurate to the scale of theft of public
assets and corruption worldwide. The discipline of asset recovery is
still young and experienced practitioners who can assist countries in
charting a course through what is always a terribly complex and
confusing field are few and far between. However, mounting interest
in the topic, the G8 call for transparency and heightened media
scrutiny are changing that and are coming together to force action.
Let us hope that some of the tools outlined in the paper will provide
an avenue to guide such action.

156. Id. at 22.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 24.
159. Id. at 10.
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